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indeed, influence the social context and behavior of individuals, hence providing a fertile setting to look more closely into their impact on innovation. Third, the staggered implementation of these policies over time enables us to address some of the empirical challenges surrounding the estimation of the impact of social factors on innovation.
There are two main empirical challenges associated with assessing the impact of these social policies on innovation. Differences in innovative performance after the implementation of a social policy may be attributed to other unobservable factors that drive both changes in innovation as well as the implementation of the policy. For instance, investment in human capital through education or R&D spending may simultaneously increase both the innovation in a region and the likelihood of the implementation of social liberal policies in that region. One may also be concerned about reverse causality in that the implementation of these policies is triggered by changes in creative outcomes.
To address these challenges, we exploit the staggered timing of each policy across different states in the United States to implement a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy to estimate the effects of the (anti) liberalization policies by comparing the changes in patenting of states that have experienced a policy change in a particular year relative to states that have not yet implemented the policy. During our sample period of 1994 to 2006, 6 states and the District of Columbia legalized same-sex civil unions or domestic partnerships, 11 states legalized medical marijuana, and 34 states passed new restrictions on abortion at different points in time. Our baseline estimates control for state fixed effects and year fixed effects. We also include various longitudinal measures of political orientation, economic conditions, and human capital.
We find that the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships increases statelevel patenting by 6%, and the legalization of medical marijuana increases patenting by 7%. In contrast, the passing of an additional abortion restriction reduces patenting by about 1%. We find no evidence of any effect before the enactment of the social liberal policies. Our main results are also robust to alternative specifications and falsification tests.
Next, we explore three potential mechanisms that may explain our state-level results. Our goal here is not to establish a causal relationship between a specific explanatory variable and the outcome of interest. Instead, we follow the reverse causal inference approach, as recently advised by Gelman and Imbens (2013) , to investigate some of the possible causes of the outcome variable of interest to the extent possible. The first mechanism is proposed by the Creative Class theory and argues that liberalization policies attract inventors from other states because inventors have a preference to work and live in regions with more tolerance and openness to diversity (Florida, 2002a (Florida, , 2002b Florida et al., 2008; Jacobs, 1961; Wedemeier, 2015) . The second mechanism draws on the idea that social liberalization policies can influence individuals' attitude toward openness and diversity, leading them to have more diverse social interactions. In turn, more diverse interactions can lead to more diverse collaborations among inventors, and consequently, result in higher levels of innovative performance. The third mechanism builds on the idea that social liberal policies can lead to higher entrance into technology-based entrepreneurship by promoting more diverse social interactions and better access to complementary resources needed for entrepreneurial entry.
We do not find evidence that liberalization policies attract top inventors to a region as predicted by the Creative Class theory. Our estimates suggest that the enactment of all three policies, regardless of whether they are socially liberal or anti-liberal, on average leads to a net loss of top inventors to other regions. Meanwhile, we show several results that are consistent with the idea that social liberalization policies influence individuals' attitudes toward openness and diversity, thus affecting their collaboration patterns and the level and direction of their innovative output. We also find speculative evidence suggesting that liberalization policies are associated with an increase in technologybased entrepreneurship.
Our results make several contributions. Discussions going back as early as Schumpeter (1934) noted that a key determinant of innovation is an organization's or a society's openness to new ideas and tolerance toward disruptive behavior, or even "rebellion" against the "status quo" (pp. 86-94) . However, only recently have scholars started to empirically explore the role of social context in promoting or hindering innovation (Acemoglu, Akcigit, & Celik, 2014; Benabou, Ticchi, & Vindigni, 2015) . Our article provides one of the first empirical evidence on the relationship between the enactment of social policies and innovation. More broadly, our study contributes to the literature that has examined factors that determine regional innovation. A long line of research has demonstrated the role of skilled labor, knowledge spillovers, infrastructure, and intellectual property rights on regional innovation (Agrawal, Cockburn, Galasso, & Oettl, 2014; Alcácer & Chung, 2014; Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002; Galasso & Schankerman, 2010; Moretti & Wilson, 2014; Shaver & Flyer, 2000) . Our study emphasizes the role of social policies in promoting regional innovation. Our findings also contribute to the literature on the antecedents of collaboration. While most of prior research has largely assumed the composition of inventive teams and the network structure of inventors to be exogenous, we show how the social context and policies can influence interactions among individuals in a region and impact the formation of new collaborative ties.
The next section describes the three policies of interest briefly. We then describe the data and empirical framework, respectively. We present state-level results of the effect of the three policies on innovation. After documenting the effect, we discuss potential mechanisms. The final section offers concluding remarks.
| INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
2.1 | Same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships Policies in favor of same-sex marriage (or civil unions and domestic partnerships) are widely associated with liberal mindset and liberal policies (Kane, 2003; Soule, 2004; Soule & Earl, 2001 ). In the United States, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights and related laws can be determined by each state and local jurisdiction. The federal Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 explicitly defines marriage as between a man and a woman. In the landmark United States v. Windsor case, the Supreme Court ruled on June 26, 2013 that section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional, and the federal government is required to recognize marriages performed in states where same-sex marriage has been legalized. On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that state-level bans on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional, thereby making samesex marriage legal in the entire country. Because the legalization of same-sex marriages occurred relatively recently after our sample period, 1 we take advantage of changes in civil union and domestic partnership laws across states. Civil unions and domestic partnerships are a non-religious statesanctioned form of partnership. Like same-sex marriages before 2015, civil unions do not confer federal benefits and are not recognized under the federal law. Six states and the District of Columbia changed the legal status of civil union and domestic partnerships during our sample period (Table 1) .
Vermont was the first state to legalize same sex-sex marriage in September 2009.
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In many of these states, the legalization of same-sex marriage has since superseded civil union and domestic partnership status.
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| Medical marijuana legalization
Legalization of medical marijuana is broadly linked to liberal policies and liberal agendas in the United States and other countries (Haines-Saah, Moffat, Jenkins, & Johnson, 2014; Robinson & Fleishman, 1984 (Table 2) . They have received considerable media attention at the local and national level, in part, because many occurred through voter referendum. The debate remains contentious and ongoing.
| Abortion restrictions
Support for legal abortion has long been considered as part of the liberal agenda and policies in the United States and many other countries (Legge, 1983) . While there is no strong consensus among U.S. residents on whether women should have the legal right to abortion under any circumstance, various polls and surveys suggest that those who identify themselves as liberal are significantly more likely to be in favor of abortion rights for women (Saad, 2013) . From a legal point of view, abortion has traditionally been prohibited across many states during the early 20th century. The landmark U.S. Supreme Court 1973 decision Roe v. Wade invalidated the prior prohibitions and set the legal framework for the availability of abortion. The ruling gave women the legal right to have an abortion up to the third trimester. Since then, various states have imposed different forms of restriction on abortion through new state legislatures or amendments to the state constitution. According to the Guttmacher Institute, the number of abortion restrictions across various states in the United States has increased substantially over the past two decades. These restrictions range from extended waiting periods and mandatory counseling, to limitations on insurance coverage and near-total abortion bans (Guttmacher Institute, 2015) . We collect the data on the timing of abortion restrictions passed across all the states from the Guttmacher Institute and various other public sources. In our analysis, we use the change in the number of abortion restrictions in each state over time as the proxy for the change in the level of legal barrier for abortion in that state. The number of abortion restrictions across the states range from 0 to 15 during our sample period, with an average of about five restrictions and a standard deviation of three over the sample period. The average number of restrictions changes from about four restrictions in 1994 to six in 2006. Figure 1 illustrates the number of enacted abortion restrictions in each state in 1994 and 2006.
| DATA
Our data is collected from various sources. Following prior research (Audia & Goncalo, 2007; Fleming, Mingo, & Chen, 2007; Vakili, 2016) , we use patenting rate as a measure of innovation. To construct the patenting rate at the state and individual inventor levels, we used the Lai et al. (2011) data set available on the Patent Network Dataverse. The data covers all the patents granted by the USPTO between 1975 and 2010. Due to the long delays between application and grant dates, there is considerable right truncation in the number of granted patents in the last three years of the sample. Given that the truncation problem is likely to be more severe for the states with higher patenting rates, we only used the data for the period between 1994 and 2007. We begin our sample in 1994 based on the availability of data for our control variables and the first legalization date (1996) .
We collect data on the legalization dates of medical marijuana and same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships from various public sources as well as prior research (Wen, Hockenberry, & Cummings, 2014) . Data on abortion restrictions is collected from the Guttmacher Institute (2015) and other online public sources. We also collect the yearly total public expenditure and education expenditure by each state from the U.S. Census Bureau. Data on business R&D per state is retrieved from the National Science Foundation's Science and Engineering Indicators data set. We obtain data on the number of individuals with a bachelor degree from Census Education Attainment Reports.
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Data on hate crimes is obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports. 5 We also collect the data on cross-state population mobility from IRS' SOI Tax Stats. (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004) . In order to explore some of the potential mechanisms, we largely rely on similar empirical design and estimation models at the state or individual level with different dependent variables. These models are discussed in more detail when we explore each potential mechanism. Table 3 provides the summary statistics for our main variables between 1995 and 2007. An average state produces 2,088 utility patents per year and has 2,828 inventors as multiple inventors contribute to the same patented invention. About 32% of patents in the sample have zero citations, and on average, each patent has seven citations.
| STATE-LEVEL RESULTS
States, on average, have an annual spending expenditure of $22.5 billion, of which approximately 32% is spent on education at primary, secondary, and post-secondary levels. On average, businesses and other institutions spend about $4.8 billion on research and development at the state level. The average state population is about 5.6 million, out of which 16% has a bachelor (or higher) degree. The real per capita personal income-deflated with the national CPI (1982-1984 dollars) is about $17,000. Average housing price index is 2.6. The average income tax is approximately 3% and the average corporate tax is just above 15% at the state level. About 40% of the state governors are democrats, and democrats and republicans have roughly similar shares in the state senate and house over our sample period. There is considerable variance across states in these figures. Table 4 reports our main results on the impact of the three policies on the log-normalized patenting rate at the state level. All three policies have a significant effect on state-level patenting and the magnitudes are economically meaningful. Both the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships and the legalization of medical marijuana increase patenting at the state level by 6 and 7%, respectively. In contrast, the passage of an additional abortion restriction reduces patenting by about 1% during the sample period. A 1% increase (decrease) in patenting is roughly equivalent to 21 more (fewer) patents per year at the state level. Most controls are insignificant due to their small within-state variance over time.
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So far, our analysis has assumed that the timing of these policies is uncorrelated with factors that determine the outcomes of interest, conditional on the baseline controls. However, our estimates may suffer from reverse causality. In other words, it may be the case that states with higher patenting rate were more likely to implement social liberal policies and that what we are capturing is Subsequent analyses include the full set of controls, but we suppress them in the tables. The tables with full set of controls are available on request.
simply a continuation of trends started before these policy changes. To test this possibility, we conduct several analyses. First, we examine the state-level patenting rates before and after policy changes. In the case of reverse causality, we should be able to observe pre-trends in state-level patenting in years leading to policy changes. To investigate the presence of pre-trends, we plot the yearly treatment estimates associated with the legalization of medical marijuana and the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships at the state level (Figures 2 and 3 , respectively). Each point on these graphs is the estimated difference in log-normalized patenting between treated and control states in the years before and after the policy change. Both graphs show an increase in patenting at the state level starting approximately three years after the policy change. There is little evidence of upward trends before the implementation of the two social liberal policies. 8 We also run a series of falsification tests in the spirit of those performed by Bertrand et al. (2004) , whereby we assign 100 random placebo legalization dates for each state in the sample. Since the placebo legalization dates are selected randomly, we should see a significant effect Notes. The dependent variable is the logged number of patents in each state-year. "Legalization of same-sex civil unions" and "Legalization of medical marijuana" are indicator variables that equal to 1 after the state implements the policy change. "Number of abortion restrictions" is a count measure of the number of abortion restrictions in each state-year. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by state. 8 We cannot produce the yearly treatment graph for abortion restrictions because there are many instances of abortion restrictions in a state over time, and thus, there are no obvious pre-and post-periods.
(i.e., rejecting the null hypothesis that legalization had no effect) at the 5% level roughly 5% of the time. We obtained significant estimates for the placebo treatments only 4% of time, which suggest that our main findings are not driven by spurious trends in the data and are indeed linked to the observed policy changes. We also implemented a hazard rate analysis, where we examine whether past patenting rate could predict the timing of the implementation of these policies. The results show no significant relationship between past patenting rate and the timing of legalization events in our sample (available in Table A1 in Appendix S1).
Another concern is that the estimates may be driven by other concurrent policy changes that may increase innovation. To address this potential issue, we checked various public records to see if we can identify simultaneous policy changes in the states that have implemented each of these legalizations. We do not find consistent evidence of simultaneous policy changes at the state level. Moreover, our set of controls should at least partially capture the effect of unobserved policy changes that impact patenting through increased public spending, R&D expenditure, education, average income and living costs, and political affiliation. In short, while we cannot wholly rule out its possibility, we do not find evidence that suggests our estimates are fully driven by other concurrent policy changes.
| EXPLORING POTENTIAL MECHANISMS
Having established a robust relationship between social liberal policies and state-level patenting, we now turn to three potential mechanisms that can explain the positive effect of social liberalization policies on innovation.
| Mechanism 1: Social liberal policies and mobility
Florida (2014) defined creative class as individuals who are active in creative occupations such as research, engineering, art, entertainment, acting, design, entrepreneurship, and management. 9 In a series of works, Florida and colleagues showed that individuals belonging to the creative class have on average higher wages and salaries (Florida, 2014) , disproportionally contribute to economic development of regions (Lee, Florida, & Acs, 2004) , and are the main producers of creative output (Florida et al., 2008; Florida, 2014) . The Creative Class theory argues that creative individuals on average have a taste for certain values, like meritocracy, diversity, and openness. Hence, the theory suggests that for companies, cities, states, and countries to attract creative talent and have higher levels of creative output, they need to devise social liberal policies that promote diversity and openness to different life styles and ideas. 10 If inventors have a taste for more liberal policies, as suggested by the Creative Class theory, we should expect an increase in their movement to states that implement these policies. In contrast, we should see an increase in the number of inventors leaving a state if the state passes additional abortion restrictions.
To examine the impact of social liberal policies on the mobility of inventors, we estimate the following specification (Equation (2)):
where Y s 1 s 2 t captures the number of inventors that moved from state s 2 to state s 1 in year t. We capture mobility based on changes in the location of inventors recorded on patents filed in different years. Since a median inventor has only one patent in our sample, the sample of mobile inventors is highly skewed toward top 15% inventors in the sample. Hence, we only test the mobility argument for the sample of top inventors with this analysis. Below, we attempt to address this limitation by using complementary data sources. In the case of the two social liberalization policies, Legalization s 1 s 2 t captures the difference in the legalization status of state s 1 and state s 2 in year t.
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While all innovators fall into the creative class, the category itself is broader than only innovators.
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While the Creative Class argument has had considerable impact both outside and inside academia, it has also received criticism due to the vagueness of its measures (e.g., "Creative Class," "Bohemian Index") and endogeneity concerns surrounding the relationship between Florida's measures of tolerance and creative outcomes. For example, in his review of Florida's "The Rise of the Creative Class," Glaeser (2005) used Florida and Knudson's (2005) data to show that the estimated effect of bohemians in a metropolitan area on growth is economically and statistically insignificant after controlling for the fraction of educated adults.
The value switches to 1 if state s 1 implements the policy in year t while it is not yet implemented in state s 2 , and switches to −1 in the reverse scenario. It is equal to 0 if both states have a similar policy status. In the case of abortion restrictions, Legalization s 1 s 2 t is equal to the difference in the number of abortion restrictions in effect between state s 1 and state s 2 in year t. β is the key coefficient of interest and captures the effect of a change in policy status between s 1 and s 2 on the mobility of top inventors from state s 2 to s 1 . We also include the full set of controls for each state (and hence, their differences). All estimations include state-pair dummies, State s 1 s 2 , that would control for the timeinvariant differences between each pair of states (such as their geographical distance) that could affect mobility between them.
Columns 1 to 3 in Table 5 present the results for the effect of each policy on the mobility of top inventors across states. A negative net flow to a state means that the state has, on average, lost a net portion of its top inventors to other states due to policy implementation. In contrast, a positive flow means that the state has attracted other states' top inventors after the policy implementation. The estimates suggest that the effect of liberalization policies on inter-state net mobility of top inventors is inconsistent with the mobility arguments of the Creative Class theory. The direction of effects for the two liberalization policies is the opposite of what the Creative Class theory predicts with wide confidence intervals. The direction of the effect for the anti-liberalization policy is in line with the Creative Class prediction, but the size is small and close to zero. To corroborate our findings, we also restructured the data at the state-year-level and estimated the aggregated net flow into and out of each state in each year using an estimation model based on Equation (1) ( Table A2 in Appendix S1). Again, we do not find results consistent with the Creative Class mobility argument.
The main concern with these estimations is that the sample only includes the top 15% inventors, hence potentially excludes the mobility of to-be inventors. To address this issue, we performed the analysis based on two other measures of mobility. We first used the cross-state mobility data based Notes. In models 1-3, mobility is defined as the number of top inventors that move to the focal state from the paired state in year t. In models 4-6, mobility is defined as the number of individuals who move to the focal state from the paired state in year t (based on tax data). The independent variables capture the difference in the legalization state of the focal state and the paired state. All specifications include state-pair and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.
on tax records provided by the IRS' SOI Tax Stats. The data is constructed based on individual tax records for the entire population of the United States and covers our sample period. The downside of using this data is that it includes the whole population and not just the creative class. On the positive side, however, the data is much more reliable and does not suffer from the usual false positives and false negatives of measures based on patent data (Ge, Huang, & Png, 2016) . Using the estimation model in Equation (2) (based on a state-pair structure), we re-estimated the mobility of population as the result of the three policies. The results are reported in Columns 4 to 6 in Table 5 . Again, the estimates are not consistent with the Creative Class mobility hypothesis. The direction of the effects for the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships and for the passage of additional abortion restrictions are the opposite of what the Creative Class theory would predict. We also constructed a third measure of mobility based on two sets of education data: (a) the total number of individuals with a post-secondary degree in state s in year t, and (b) the number of individuals who received a post-secondary degree from state s in year t. Using these two sets of data, we calculated the net number of individuals with a post-secondary degree that moved to (or left) state s in year t. While this data set does not capture the whole creative class population, it captures the part of population that is likely to be at risk of patenting, assuming most inventors have postsecondary education (Table A3 in Appendix S1). Again, in the cases of both liberalization policies, the direction of effects is opposite of the creative class prediction. None of the effects are significant at the 10% lel.
Taken together, we do not find support for the Creative Class argument that the implementation of social liberal policies would attract top talent from other regions. One should note that the lack of support for the Creative Class argument in our setting does not invalidate the theory. Inventors are only a subsample of the creative class population and they may perceive and react to these policy changes differently from other creative workers. Research based on more accurate data on the mobility of to-be inventors and the heterogeneous effects of these policies may also shed more light on inventors' mobility.
| Mechanism 2: Social liberal policies and interactions among diverse individuals
The second potential mechanism that can explain the effect of social liberal policies on innovative outcomes is based on the argument that the enactment of social liberal policies can lead to more social liberal public opinion on average, hence leading to more diverse social interactions and collaborations. Moreover, social liberal policies can legitimize an issue, and hence, decrease its significance as a fault line and a barrier for collaboration. Consequently, more diverse collaborations can lead to higher levels of innovative output and more novel innovations.
Over the past few years, public policy scholars have provided substantial empirical evidence that social liberal policies influence social liberal public opinion. For instance, Kreitzer, Hamilton, and Tolbert (2014) showed that the Supreme Court ruling in Varnum v. Brien, which established samesex marriage, had a causal and significant effect on public opinion of minority rights. They argued that the signaling of the court decision shifted individuals' opinions toward being more consistent with the new state law, particularly, for individuals who were on the margin. Hanley, Salamone, and Wright (2012) found that the Roe v. Wade decision shifted the public support toward more support for abortion among those who were aware of the decision. Flores and Barclay (2016) showed that residents of states that legalized same-sex marriage subsequently significantly reduced their anti-gay attitudes. Other research in sociology and political science showed that social liberal policies are associated with higher levels of social diversity, increase general trust, and promote interactions between individuals with more heterogeneous views, life styles, and racial-ethnic backgrounds (Heller, 1996; Levi, 1998; Szalacha, 2003; Tendler & Freedheim, 1994; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000) . Hence, social liberalization policies can impact the public opinion of a region toward openness and diversity.
Individuals' public opinions, in turn, affect their social interactions and behaviors. For example, studies in sociology and psychology have shown that liberal individuals are more likely to be in favor of social change and equality, while non-liberals usually place more emphasis on tradition and stability (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Schwartz, 1996; Tetlock, 2000) . Particularly relevant to our argument, liberal views are shown to be strongly associated with more diverse social interaction. Anderson, Goel, Huber, Malhotra, and Watts (2014) found that individuals with stronger liberal views express lower levels of same-race preference (i.e., racial homophily) for their dating partners and are more likely to date individuals from a different race than those with more conservative views. Work in applied psychology suggest that individuals' attitudes toward diversity shape their social interactions (Perrine, 2005) .
11
Social interactions are precursors to collaborations. To the extent that individual's collaboration networks are to some extent shaped by their social interactions, an increase in the diversity of one's social interactions should arguably lead to an increase in the diversity of their collaborators as well. Prior research in strategy and innovation has highlighted the importance of diversity in knowledge, background, and perspectives in the innovation process (Hong & Page, 2004; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010) . Diverse teams tend to have higher performance than homogenous teams because individuals on diverse teams are more likely to evaluate problems differently and have less redundant knowledge (Burt, 2004; Hong & Page, 2004) . Given that knowledge recombination is central to the innovation process (Fleming, 2001; Kaplan & Vakili, 2015; Simonton, 1999) , more diverse collaborations that combine distinct knowledge and ideas are more likely to produce more breakthrough innovation.
In summary, this mechanism can be broken down into the following arguments: social liberal policies can influence the views of individuals toward openness and diversity; consequently, these policies can increase the diversity of individuals' social interactions and collaborations; this, in turn, can boost individuals' innovation output and result in more novel knowledge recombinations and more breakthrough innovations.
Several recent studies in political science have provided evidence for the first part of the argument-that is, social liberal policies lead to more social liberal public opinion. We corroborate these findings using a measure of public opinion, developed by Enns and Koch (2013) . 12 In particular, we can show that the effect of these policies on state-level patenting rate is at least partially mediated through changing the liberal views of individuals ( Figure A1 in Appendix S1). There is relatively less evidence on the impact of these policies on openness and diversity of social interaction. We provide indirect evidence for this link by examining the impact of the three policies on two proxies for openness and social interaction diversity at the state level and two measures of collaboration diversity at the individual level. The first state-level measure is based on the "city citation" variable developed in Gambardella and Giarratana (2010) , and is equal to the ratio of the citations by each patent to prior patents with at least one inventor in the same city as focal patent's inventors over the total number of citations by that patent to previous patents. At the state level, we construct the measure as the average share of local citations for all patents filed in each 11 Perrine (2005) found that freshmen students who were more open to diversity during orientation week tended to develop more interpersonal interactions with other students and faculty, and improved their learning outcomes. 12 Enns and Koch (2013) used demographic and geographic information from more than 740,000 respondents to generate a dynamic state-measure of partisanship, ideology, and the public's policy mood from 1956 to 2010. We use a mean centered and standardized version of their measure. state in any given year. An increase in social interactions and diversity of interactions in a location should arguably lead to an increase in local knowledge diffusion, which would manifest in an increase in the share of local patent citations (Gambardella & Giarratana, 2010) . Columns 1 to 3 in Table 6 present the estimated effects of each policy on the share of local citations at the state level. The results confirm this argument. Approximately 5.8% of the citations in each state are local (i.e., are to prior patents with at least one inventor in the same city as the focal patents' inventors). The estimates suggest that the liberalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships, and the liberalization of medical marijuana increase the share of local citations by 15 and 11%, respectively. The increase is equivalent to approximately 1 percentage point increase in the share of local citation. The estimated effect of the passage of additional abortion restrictions is not significant, but is in the predicted direction.
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The second measure is based on the pace of knowledge circulation in each region. If social liberal policies do indeed lead to more openness and social interactions among inventors in a region, we should expect an increase in the pace of knowledge diffusion. We use the time gap (measured in number of days) between the application date of each patent and the application dates of patents cited as prior art as a proxy for the pace of knowledge diffusion. We then construct the measure at the state level in any given year by calculating the mean time gap for each patent and its prior arts filed in that state year. We expect the time gap to shrink if the pace of knowledge circulation in a region increases. The average time gap between patents and prior arts at the state-year level is Notes. Share of local citations for a patent is defined as the ratio of the number of citations to patents by at least one inventor in the same city over the total number of citations. The share of local citations at the state level in a year is the mean of the share of local citations for all patents filed in that state in that year. Time gap between a patent and its cited prior arts is calculated as the average number of days between the focal patent's application date and the application dates of the cited patents by the focal patent. The time gap between patents and cited prior arts at the state level in a year is equivalent to the mean of time gap for all patents filed in the state in that year. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.
The measure is somewhat noisy due to the use of city names to construct the measure. For example, while in practice, a citation from an inventor in San Francisco to another inventor in Berkeley is arguably a local citation, due to our reliance on city names, such a citation would be considered non-local. We do not expect the noisiness in data to be systematically biasing our estimates, but they can increase the standard errors of the estimated coefficients. approximately 3,329 days (or 9.1 years) during our sample period. The results in Columns 4 to 6 of Table 6 suggest that the legalization of same-sex civil unions and the legalization of medical marijuana decreases the time gap by 10 and 3% (equivalent to 340 and 112 days), respectively. The estimated effect for the additional abortion restrictions is not significant at the 10% level, but the direction of the effect is in line with the prediction.
In addition, we exploit the variation in acceptance of the subject matter of the two liberalization policies at the time of their implementations in treated states to explore the role of public opinion in shaping the effect of these policies on innovation output. The core idea is that in states where public opinion is already largely aligned with these policies, their implementation will not cause a large change in public opinion and hence should not have a large effect on innovation output. In contrast, we should expect larger effects in states where the subject matter of these policies is more contested, and hence, there is arguably more room for the legalization events to influence the public opinion. The results (Table A5 in Appendix S1) confirm our predictions. The preceding analyses suggest that social liberalization policies can impact the state-level innovation outcomes by influencing public opinion, and their effects are larger in states where the public opinion is less aligned with the policies.
Next, we present individual-level evidence on the effect of these policies on the collaboration diversity of inventors and their innovation output. To isolate the effect of each policy on individual inventors, we only include incumbent inventors in the sample, that is, inventors who had at least one patent prior to a policy change in their state of residence. We also exclude mobile inventors to control for the mobility dynamics to the extent possible. In the case of abortion restrictions, since some states have passed additional abortion restrictions at different points of time, we only include inventors that have at least one patent before the first event in our sample and never change their state throughout the sample period. We thus expect the estimates associated with additional abortion restrictions to be noisier and more attenuated due to more restrictive sampling and the longer time needed to observe the effects. To estimate the impact of the policies on inventor level outcomes, we use the following equation:
where Y ist is the outcome of interest for inventor i (residing in state s) in year t. Legalization ist is equal to 1 if inventor i is located in state s that has implemented the policy of interest in year t, and 0 otherwise. Again, in the case of abortion restrictions, Legalization ist is the number of abortion restrictions in effect for inventor i located in state s in year t. X ist includes time-varying state-level controls from the above specification as well as inventor experience measured by the number of patents granted to inventor i in a five-year window. In addition, we control for inventor and year fixed effects (Inventor i and Year t , respectively). First, we test the effect of each policy on the patenting rate of incumbent inventors. Table 7 reports the results for the impact of each policy on the logged-normalized patenting of non-mobile incumbent inventors. The estimated coefficients suggest that the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships increase individual patenting by approximately 2.9%. Similarly, legalization of medical marijuana increases incumbent inventors' patenting by over 4.6%. In contrast, the passage of an additional abortion restriction reduces individual patenting by approximately 0.1%.
Next, we test the impact of the three policies on collaboration diversity of inventors. We use two different measures of diversity in collaboration. The first measure is based on the number of new collaborative ties formed by each inventor. A pair-wise collaboration between inventor i and another inventor is considered new if no such collaboration has occurred between 1976 (the first year in both Lai et al. and NBER patent data sets) and year t − 1. We only use unique observations of pairwise collaborations. In other words, if inventor i collaborates with the same person on two different patents in the same year, we count only one unique collaboration.
The second measure captures the diversity in the knowledge base of inventors involved in each patent at the individual level. To construct the measure, we first extracted the set of technological classes in which each inventor and her co-inventors have patented prior to focal patent on which they are collaborating. For each inventor and her co-inventors, we then calculated the breadth of inventive experience of the team as measured by the count of unique technological classes in which they have patented before. We then take the mean of this measure across all patents of each inventor in any given year to construct the new variable. An increase in the co-inventors' knowledge breadth signals an increase in the diversity of knowledge that the focal inventor gains access to through collaboration. In all estimations, we further control for the total number of pair-wise collaborations for inventor i in year t to capture the effect of each policy on collaboration diversity above and beyond its effect on the total number of collaborations. Models 1 to 3 in Table 8 report the estimated effect of each policy on the number of new collaborative ties formed by incumbent inventors. The estimates suggest that the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships leads to a 22% increase 14 in the incumbent inventor's new pair-wise collaborative ties. The change in the number of new collaborative ties is above and beyond the change in the total number of collaborative ties. Similarly, the legalization of medical marijuana leads to an increase of approximately 17% in incumbent inventor's new collaborative ties. The estimate for the passage of abortion restrictions is not significant at the 10% level. Models 4 to 6 present the estimated effects of each policy on the average knowledge breadth of co-inventors. Incumbent inventors on average have worked in inventive teams with a prior experience of patenting across more than three technological classes. The results suggest that the legalization of same-sex civil Notes. This table examines the impact of liberalization policies on the patenting rate of incumbent inventors. All specifications include inventor and year fixed effects. All specifications include the inventor's experience and the full set of state-level time varying controls. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.
14 The percentage increases are calculated based on the mean number of new collaborative ties for the inventors included in each regression. The mean values used for each regression are slightly different from those reported in Table 3 since the set of incumbent inventors changes depending on the implementation date of each policy.
unions and the legalization of medical marijuana increase technological breadth of inventive teams involving incumbent inventors by approximately 1 and 5%, respectively. 15 The estimated effect for the passage of additional abortion restrictions is not significant at the 10% level, though the sign is consistent with the prediction. So far, we have shown evidence that social liberalization policies are associated with change in public opinions, and the diversity of social interactions and collaborations. The third part of the argument behind this mechanism suggests that an increase in the diversity of collaborations positively affects the novelty and impact of innovation outcomes. Here, we first show the effect of the three policies on the share of novel recombinations and the number of breakthroughs by incumbent inventors. Subsequently, we provide some evidence that the effect is potentially mediated through the change in the collaboration diversity of inventors.
The U.S. Patent Office organizes technological domains into approximately 100,000 technological subclasses and assigns one or more subclasses to each patent. Following Fleming et al. (2007) , we define a novel technological recombination as an instance where a new subclass pair is assigned for the first time to a patent. For each patent, we then define the share of novel recombinations as the ratio of novel subclass pairs to total subclass pairs assigned to the patent. We subsequently construct inventor i's share of novel recombinations in year t by taking the mean of the share of novel recombinations in i's patents in year t. To calculate the share of breakthrough inventions, following prior research, we use the share of inventor i's patents that belong to the top 10% highly cited patents in year t. Table 9 reports the results. The results in Model 1 suggest a 0.2 percentage point increase in the incumbent inventors' share of novel recombinations after the legalization of same- The percentage increases are calculated based on the mean technological breadth of inventive teams for the inventors included in each regression.
sex civil unions and domestic partnerships. Given that approximately 2% of all class recombinations are novel in the sample, a 0.1 percentage point increase is equivalent to an average 5% increase in the share of novel recombinations. Similarly, the estimates in Model 2 suggest a 0.3 percentage point increase in the incumbent inventor's share of novel recombinations after the legalization of medicinal marijuana. The estimated effect is not significant at the 10% level for the passage of additional abortion restrictions. Models 4-6 in Table 9 report the effect of each policy on the share of breakthrough innovations. The results in Model 4 suggest that the effect of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships on the share of breakthrough innovations is positive, but not significant at the 10% level. The estimates in Model 5 show a 0.4 percentage point increase in incumbent inventor's share of breakthrough innovations after the legalization of medical marijuana. Results in Model 6 suggest that an additional abortion restriction reduces incumbent inventor's share of breakthrough innovations by 0.1 percentage points.
Finally, we test whether the policy effects on innovation rate, novel recombinations and breakthrough innovations are mediated through the change in collaboration patterns. Figures A2 and A3 in Appendix S1 present the results for the mediation analyses in the cases of the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships and the legalization of medical marijuana. They suggest that more than 70% of the effect of these policies on rate, novelty, and impact of innovation outcomes is driven by the increase in the diversity of incumbents' collaborations (as measured by the share of new collaborative ties and inventive team's knowledge diversity). While these results do not provide causal evidence on the relationship between the policies and outcomes, they provide a more fine-grained depiction of the chain of effects at the individual level and are consistent with the idea that social liberal policies are associated with more diverse collaborations, which in turn, can lead to more novel and impactful innovations. Notes. The share of novel recombinations is the share of novel subclass pairs out of total subclass pairs assigned to each inventor's patents in a year. Share of patents in the top 10% highly cites patents is the logged number of patents that fall into the top 10% highly cited patents at the inventor level. All specifications include inventor and year fixed effects and controls for inventor's experience, inventor's number of patents, and the full set of state-level time varying controls. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.
| Mechanism 3: Social liberal policies and entrepreneurship
By promoting more diverse social interactions, social liberal policies can also facilitate higher rates of entrance into entrepreneurship. Access to more diverse connections can enable individuals to receive more timely information on entrepreneurial opportunities, an important driving factor of entrepreneurial entry (Burt, 1987 (Burt, , 2004 . Moreover, individuals with more diverse interaction are more likely to find and mobilize the complementary resources, including financial, human, and physical capital, needed to start an entrepreneurial venture (Burt, 2000) . To the extent that a social liberal policy lowers discriminatory behavior, it can also facilitate access to the labor market and more mainstream channels for raising capital, further supporting entrepreneurial activities. Higher rates of entrepreneurship, particularly in high-tech segments, can further lead to higher levels of innovation undertaken by new ventures. One should note that the impact of social policies on incumbent inventors is not fully separate from their impact on entrepreneurial entry. Both rely on an increase in diverse social interactions at the individual level. Moreover, entrepreneurial entry may be partly driven by incumbent inventors pursuing opportunities opened up by their inventions. However, the two have some theoretical distinctions. The former effect largely relies on knowledge recombination advantages created by more diverse networks. The latter relies more on access to complementary resources and better access to labor and capital markets.
Empirically testing the impact of social liberal policies on entrepreneurship and its underlying mechanisms requires rich data on new ventures, the characteristics of entrepreneurs, and their network structure. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to observe this information. Nevertheless, we can provide some indirect evidence for the impact of the social policies on entrepreneurship in our setting. Specifically, we use the number of new firms patenting in a state as a proxy for entrepreneurship. We use the assignee information on a patent to identify the organization to which the patent is assigned. Location of inventors on each patent is used to determine the state location of each organization.
16 Table 10 presents the estimated impact of each policy in our setting on the number of patenting organizations at the state level using the estimation model in Equation (1). The results show that the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships, and the legalization of medical marijuana increase the number of patenting organizations in each state by 9 and 12%, respectively. In contrast, the passage of an additional abortion restriction decreases the number of patenting organizations in a state by approximately 1%. All three estimates are significant at the 1% level. Our mediation analysis ( Figure A4 in Appendix S1) further suggests that the change in individuals' liberal views partially mediates the effect of each policy on new patenting organizations. In Table 11 we explore the effect of these policies by organization size. The results suggest that social liberal policies disproportionately increase the effect on the patenting rate of smaller organizations (where size is proxied by the size of patent stock at the time of policy implementation), while they disproportionately decrease the effect on larger organizations.
17 Taken together with the extensive margin effect from Table 11 , these results suggest that social liberal policies may have facilitated entrepreneurship entry and disproportionately benefited smaller firms.
16
Note that many companies register their headquarters in states other than where they actually operate for legal and tax purposes. To address this issue, we use the state location of inventors to assign organizations to states. An organization may be assigned to multiple states if its inventors reside in multiple states.
17
In the case of abortion restrictions, we cannot construct the "size of patent stock" since there are several states with multiple restrictions implemented at different points of time.
Our measure of entrepreneurial entrance has some limitations. Most important, if an established organization starts patenting for the first time, it will be identified as a new venture in our data. Unfortunately, we cannot separate new ventures from large organizations that patent for the first time after a policy change using patent data. Hence, readers should interpret this result with caution. We hope that future research can investigate the link between social policies and entrepreneurship more extensively. 
| Other mechanisms
There are potentially other mechanisms that we have not tested. For example, the social liberal policies may influence the incentive structure for innovation within firms and their hiring and promotion policies by affecting the views of their CEOs and top management. Past research shows that firms whose managers have more liberal views are more likely to have gender parity in hiring and promotion rates (Carnahan & Greenwood, 2017) . These policies may also directly influence the motivations of creative individuals. Legally mandated social policies, similar to those in our setting, can also affect discriminatory behavior which can have important labor productivity outcomes. Our aim in this article is not to unravel all the possible mechanisms behind the estimated first-order effect of social policies on innovation. Rather, our goal is to establish the significant role of social policies in shaping innovation outcomes across regions and to take a first step toward exploring some of the possible underlying mechanisms.
| DISCUSSION
Innovation is shaped by the social interactions of individuals. Yet, little is known about how social policies and context influence innovation. Our article documents the first-order impact of social policies and context on innovation. To address the endogeneity issues, we exploit the staggered timing of two social liberal policies-the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships, and the legalization of medical marijuana-and one anti-liberalization policy-the passage of abortion restrictions-across different states of the United States. The results show that the two social liberalization policies have a significant, positive, and economically meaningful effect on state-level innovation output, while passage of additional abortion restrictions has the opposite effect. We also test three possible mechanisms through which social (anti) liberal policies can influence innovative outcomes in a region: attracting talent from other regions, increasing incumbent inventors' innovation output through promoting more diverse social interactions, and increasing entrance into entrepreneurship. We do not find support for the claim that regions with more liberal environments attract creative talent from other regions. However, we find support for the argument suggesting that social liberal policies can promote more diverse social interactions, potentially through promoting more openness toward diversity. Speculatively, we also find evidence for the positive impact of social liberal policies on entrepreneurship.
Our analyses are not without their limitations. While we have attempted to provide evidence of micro-mechanisms at the individual and state level that drive the main results, there are many steps between the implementation of the policies and innovation outcomes. Thus, there is still the concern that changes in individual outcomes are attributed to other concurrent policies at the regional level. Moreover, we lack fine-grained data on the mobility of to-be inventors, which precludes us from teasing out the channel through which social liberal environments impact the mobility of inventors. Our mobility estimates also ignore the possible heterogeneity in inventors' mobility decisions in response to these policies. For instance, experienced inventors may have lower location switching costs or they may face increasing competition from the entrance of new inventors. For these reasons, we are limited in our ability to provide strong causal evidence on the underlying drivers of the impact of social liberal policies on innovation. Nevertheless, we provide one of the first empirical evidence for the impact of social liberal policies on innovation outcomes at the state and individual levels.
Our findings have several individual, firm, and policy implications. From a theoretical point of view, we provide additional insight into the antecedents of collaborative ties within the innovation context (Teodoridis, Bikard, & Vakili, 2018) . Prior research has largely assumed teams and inventive ties as given and focused on the consequences of team composition on innovation outcomes. We show how the social context within which innovation takes place can shape the inventive collaborations among individuals, and thus, influence their innovation outcomes.
Prior literature on location decisions largely emphasizes the role of knowledge, human capital and other agglomeration factors in shaping the location decision of firms (Alcácer & Chung, 2014; Shaver & Flyer, 2000) . Our results suggest that the effect of social liberal policies at the regional level operate, at least partially, at the individual level and through the interactions of individuals in that region. This highlights the importance of considering the social environment of a region when making location decisions.
At the firm level, our findings also inform the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Recent studies have provided some evidence for the positive effect of CSR practices on the financial performance of companies (Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014; Flammer, 2015) . Past research shows how CSR can increase employees' morale (Solomon & Hanson, 1985) and appeal to employees' preference for non-pecuniary benefits by adding purpose and meaningfulness to their work (Burbano, 2016) . Our findings add a new potential mechanism through which CSR can positively influence firms' financial performance. In particular, our findings suggest that the CSR practices that particularly promote diversity and inclusive employment at the workplace (such as pro-LGBT policies) can influence the competitive advantage of firms by increasing the innovative productivity of existing employees by promoting more diverse teams and connections in the organization. At the national and regional level, enacting more social liberal policies can potentially lead to superior creative and innovative performance and create regional competitive advantage. Some states are in the process of reviewing the impact of civil right laws on the economic productivity of the region. 18 Our results can provide more insights into the implications of these decisions.
Finally, our work calls for further research into the relatively unexplored relationship between innovation and social context. For instance, what are the contingencies under which social liberal policies may positively (or negatively) influence innovation outcomes? How does the interaction between social policies and economic policies affect the innovation process? What is the effect of social liberal policies on other issues related to creativity and innovation such as job creation and labor productivity? Shedding light on these questions will undoubtedly inform our understanding of the determinants of individual, organizational, and regional innovation.
